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Abstract
The spread of COVID-19 has sparked racism, hate, and xeno-
phobia in social media targeted at Chinese and broader Asian
communities. However, little is known about how racial hate
spreads during a pandemic and the role of counterhate speech
in mitigating the spread. Here we study the evolution and
spread of anti-Asian hate speech through the lens of Twitter.
We create COVID-HATE, the largest dataset of anti-Asian
hate and counterhate spanning three months, containing over
30 million tweets, and a social network with over 87 mil-
lion nodes. By creating a novel hand-labeled dataset of 2,400
tweets, we train a text classifier to identify hate and coun-
terhate tweets that achieves an average AUROC of 0.852.
We identify 891,204 hate and 200,198 counterhate tweets in
COVID-HATE. Using this data to conduct longitudinal anal-
ysis, we find that while hateful users are less engaged in the
COVID-19 discussions prior to their first anti-Asian tweet,
they become more vocal and engaged afterwards compared to
counterhate users. We find that bots comprise 10.4% of hate-
ful users and are more vocal and hateful compared to non-bot
users. Comparing bot accounts, we show that hateful bots are
more successful in attracting followers compared to counter-
hate bots. Analysis of the social network reveals that hateful
and counterhate users interact and engage extensively with
one another, instead of living in isolated polarized communi-
ties. Furthermore, we find that hate is contagious and nodes
are highly likely to become hateful after being exposed to
hateful content. Importantly, our analysis reveals that coun-
terhate messages can discourage users from turning hateful
in the first place. Overall, this work presents a comprehen-
sive overview of anti-Asian hate and counterhate content dur-
ing a pandemic. The COVID-HATE dataset is available at:
http://claws.cc.gatech.edu/covid.
Introduction
The global outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 or COVID-
19 has caused widespread disruption in the personal, social,
and economic lives of people. The upheaval has resulted
in increased levels of fear, anxiety, and outbursts of strong
emotions (Ahorsu et al. 2020; Zandifar and Badrfam 2020;
Miller 2020; Montemurro 2020). This has led to hateful inci-
dents throughout the world, such as acts of microaggression,
physical and verbal abuse, and online harassment (Arnold
2020). Following the origin of COVID-19 in China, these in-
Figure 1: The COVID-HATE social network containing hate nodes
(orange), counterhate nodes (blue), and neutral nodes (gray).
cidents have increasingly been targeted towards Chinese and
broader Asian communities (Joubin 2020; Coates 2020), re-
sulting in 1,497 racially-motivated hateful incidents in less
than a month, according to a recent survey conducted by
the A3PCON1 and CAA2 (Jeung and Nham 2020). Further-
more, the FBI has warned of a potential surge in anti-Asian
hate crimes motivated by COVID-19 (Margolin 2020).
While there is mounting evidence of offline discrimina-
tory acts, racism, and xenophobia during COVID-19, the ex-
tent of such overtly hateful content on the web and social
media is not known. At the same time, while efforts to edu-
cate about, curb, and counter hate have been made via social
media campaigns (e.g. the #RacismIsAVirus campaign), but
their success, effectiveness, and reach remain unclear. More-
over, online hate speech has severe negative impact on the
victims, often deteriorating their mental health and causing
1The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council
2Chinese for Affirmative Action organization
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anxiety (Saha, Chandrasekharan, and De Choudhury 2019).
Thus, it is critical to study the prevalence and impact of
online hate and counterhate speech in the COVID-19 dis-
course.
Most existing research on online hate speech and harass-
ment do not focus on anti-Asian hate and are not situated in
the context of a pandemic (ElSherief et al. 2018a; Liu et al.
2018; Mathew et al. 2019a). A few very recent and concur-
rent works have released datasets on COVID-19-related hate
and xenophobic writing against Asians (Vidgen et al. 2020;
Schild et al. 2020). The dataset by Schild et al. (2020) con-
sists of multi-platform hate, but does not involve counter-
hate. Vidgen et al. (2020) include extensive hand labels for
hate and counterhate tweets, but they do not include any
analysis of the hate ecosystem and its evolution. Here we
bridge these gaps.
Our contributions. In this paper, we present
COVID-HATE, the largest dataset of anti-Asian hate
and counterhate speech on Twitter in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, along with a long-term longitudinal
study. We make the following key contributions:
• We create a dataset of COVID-19-related tweets, contain-
ing over 30 million tweets made between January 15 and
April 17, 2020. We also crawl the social network of users,
containing over 87 million nodes and 717 million edges.
A hate network subgraph is shown in Figure 1.
• We annotate 2,400 tweets based on their hatefulness to-
wards Asians as hate, counterhate, or neutral tweets. We
build a highly accurate text classifier to automatically
identify hate and counterhate tweets. This classifier iden-
tifies 891,204 hate and 200,198 counterhate tweets.
• We conduct statistical, linguistic, geographic, and net-
work analysis of hate and counterhate tweets and users
to reveal characteristic patterns of the origin, evolution,
and spread of anti-Asian hate throughout the world. We
analyse the role of bots in this ecosystem.
• We perform a social contagion study to show that anti-
Asian hate begets hate, and counterhate is slightly effec-
tive in preventing hate speech.
The COVID-HATE dataset is available on the project
website: http://claws.cc.gatech.edu/covid.
COVID-HATE: An Anti-Asian Hate and
Counterhate Dataset
In this section, we describe COVID-HATE, a Twitter dataset
containing COVID-19 related anti-Asian hate and counter-
hate tweets and network. Table 1 references the statistics of
our dataset.
Tweet Dataset
We adopted a keyword-based approach to collect relevant
COVID-19 tweets through Twitter’s official APIs. The com-
plete list of keywords is present in the Appendix. We used
a collection of 42 keywords and hashtags belonging to
three sets: (a) covid-19 keywords: contain popular
terms related to COVID-19 (e.g. #coronavirus), (b) hate
Table 1: Statistic of our COVID-HATE dataset. This is the
largest dataset of anti-Asian hate and counterhate speech on
Twitter in the context of COVID-19.
Property Statistic
Duration Jan 15–Apr 17, 2020
Number of tweets 30,929,269
Number of (frac.) hateful tweets 891,204 (2.88%)
Number of (frac.) counterhate tweets 200,198 (0.65%)
Number of (frac.) neutral tweets 26,837,429 (86.77%)
Number of users 7,833,194
Number of (frac.) hateful users 393,897 (5.03%)
Number of (frac.) counterhate users 136,154 (1.74%)
Number of (frac.) neutral users 6,812,695 (86.97%)
Number of nodes in the network 87,851,137
Number of edges in the network 717,087,317
keywords: contain keywords and hashtags relevant to anti-
Asian hate and COVID-19 (e.g. #chinavirus). The hashtags
were selected based on their popularity and tweet volume,
and the list also includes Asian slurs obtained from Hate-
Base3, and finally, (c) counterhate keywords: con-
tain hashtags that were popularly used to organize efforts to
counter hate speech (e.g. #RacismIsAVirus).
Using these keywords, we collected 30,929,269 English-
language tweets made by 7,833,194 users between January
15, 2020 and April 17, 2020. We also removed all retweets
to focus our analysis only on original content.
Twitter Network Construction: In addition to the
tweets, we crawled the ego-network (i.e., the followers and
followees) of a randomly-sampled subset of users who have
made at least one COVID-19 tweet. A total of 489,011 users’
neighborhoods were obtained. The resulting network has
87,851,137 users and 717,087,317 edges.
Annotating Anti-Asian Hate And Counterhate
Tweets
Since there are no ground truth labels of Anti-Asian hate or
counterhate for tweets, we hand-label a subset of tweets and
create a textual classifier to label the rest.4
Even though tweets may have explicitly hateful hashtags,
categorizing tweets simply based on the presence or absence
of these hashtags is insufficient because hashtags are often
added to gain visibility and to promote tweets. Conversely, a
tweet can be hateful even without having a hateful hashtag.
The equivalent is true for counterhate tweets. Thus, we de-
veloped a rigorous labeling process to establish the ground
truth categories of tweets based on the tweet content.
We labeled the tweets into the following three broad cat-
egories, as we describe below.
Anti-Asian COVID-19 Hate Tweets: We build on previ-
ous studies of racial hate from the social and information sci-
ence literature to define anti-Asian hate. Specifically, Parekh
and others (2012) and Fortuna and Nunes (2018) established
that hate speech is directed at an individual or group based
3https://hatebase.org/
4We acknowledge the concurrent work by Vidgen et al. (2020)
and leave comparison of the two annotations for future work.
on “an arbitrary or normatively irrelevant feature,” and that it
casts the target as an “undesirable presence and a legitimate
object of hostility.”
Building on this, we define anti-Asian COVID-19 hate as
antagonistic speech that: (a) has one or more covid-19
keywords, (b) is directed towards an individual or a group
of Asian people, organization, country, or government, and
(c) is abusive, derogatory, or assigns blame for the creation,
spread, misrepresentation, or mismanagement of COVID-
19.
One example of tweet labeled as anti-Asian hate says:
It’s the Chinese virus, from China, caused by your disgust-
ing eating habits, your cruelty. Boycott anything Chinese
#kungflu #chinaliedpeopledied #covid
Pro-Asian COVID-19 Counterhate Tweets: This cate-
gory of tweets is COVID-19-related (tweets have at least
one of the covid-19 keywords) and can either explic-
itly: (a) identify, criticize, and actively oppose racism, hate
speech, or violence towards Asian people, community, coun-
try, or government, or (b) support and defend the Asian peo-
ple, community, country, or government.
These tweets can either be direct replies to hateful tweets
or be stand-alone tweets. An example of a tweet in this cat-
egory is as follows (censorship ours):
The virus did inherently come from China but you cant just
call it the Chinese virus because thats racist. or KungFlu be-
cause 1. Its not a f*****g flu it is a Coronavirus which is a
type of virus. And 2. Thats also racist.
Hate-Neutral Tweets: These are tweets that are neither
explicitly nor implicitly hateful, nor counterhateful, yet con-
tain content related to COVID-19. Many tweets in this cat-
egory are news-related, advertisements, or outright spam.
One example of a tweet in this category is:
COVID-19: #WhiteHouse Asks Congress For $2.5 Bn To
Fight #Coronavirus: Reports #worldpowers #climatesecu-
rity #disobedientdss #senate #politics #news #unsc #breaking
#breakingnews #wuhan #wuhanvirus https://t.co/XipNDc
Labeling process: Two authors labeled 2,400 tweets in
total in multiple rounds. The tweets were randomly sampled
from the set of tweets collected in the data collection pro-
cess. Since the majority of tweets were expected to be neu-
tral, we over-sampled tweets that contain Asian, hate, and
counterhate terms. This ensured our labeling process yielded
sufficient hate and counterhate tweets to train a classifier.
The first round of labeling was done using a preliminary
category definition. Two authors, i.e., annotators, indepen-
dently labeled a set of 100 tweets. After independent la-
beling, both annotators resolved disagreements and updated
the labeling guidelines and tweet category definitions based
on the discussions. This resulted in the final definitions pre-
sented above. Next, 300 tweets were labeled independently
by both annotators. This round led to near-perfect inter-rater
agreement, ensuring the applicability and soundness of the
labeling criteria. Finally, another 2,000 tweets were labeled.
Overall, post removal of some duplicates, we were left
with 2,319 labeled tweets, containing 678 hateful, 359 coun-
terhate, and 961 neutral tweets. The remaining 321 tweets
Table 2: Tweet classification performance of feature sets.
The best performing value in each category is shown in bold.
Feature Set Precision Recall F1 score AUROC
Hate tweet detection
Ling 60.8 ± 2.4% 39.9 ± 3.6% 48.1 ± 3.5% 0.760 ± 0.012
Hash 71.0 ± 3.4% 40.4 ± 5.1% 51.4 ± 5.0% 0.798 ± 0.031
Emb 71.1 ± 3.3% 60.7 ± 3.8% 65.5 ± 3.2% 0.864 ± 0.017
Ling+Hash 69.4 ± 0.5% 57.2 ± 3.9% 62.7 ± 2.5% 0.851 ± 0.017
Emb+Hash 72.3 ± 2.8% 63.8 ± 2.6% 67.8 ± 2.4% 0.876 ± 0.019
All 68.9 ± 3.1% 64.4 ± 4.8% 66.5 ± 3.7% 0.867 ± 0.017
Counterhate tweet detection
Ling 44.6 ± 7.3% 13.1 ± 3.7% 20.1 ± 5.0% 0.728 ± 0.033
Hash 52.0 ± 21.6% 3.6 ± 1.1% 6.7 ± 2.1% 0.793 ± 0.016
Emb 57.6 ± 9.0% 38.9 ± 6.0% 46.0 ± 5.7% 0.833 ± 0.019
Ling+Hash 54.2 ± 8.9% 29.7 ± 2.4% 38.2 ± 3.4% 0.807 ± 0.032
Emb+Hash 58.0 ± 7.1% 42.8 ± 6.3% 49.0 ± 5.9% 0.852 ± 0.019
All 52.8 ± 4.8% 41.1 ± 5.8% 46.0 ± 4.8% 0.836 ± 0.028
Neutral tweet detection
Ling 63.2 ± 1.2% 57.3 ± 3.7% 60.1 ± 2.3% 0.738 ± 0.014
Hash 60.2 ± 0.9% 59.1 ± 1.2% 59.6 ± 1.0% 0.722 ± 0.015
Emb 72.2 ± 3.2% 66.5 ± 1.7% 69.2 ± 1.9% 0.823 ± 0.014
Ling+Hash 65.7 ± 2.4% 62.9 ± 2.3% 64.2 ± 0.9% 0.789 ± 0.003
Emb+Hash 72.0 ± 4.2% 66.5 ± 1.5% 69.1 ± 2.6% 0.828 ± 0.014
All 70.8 ± 2.4% 65.3 ± 2.2% 67.9 ± 1.1% 0.820 ± 0.010
contained aggression directed towards non-Asian groups.
We focus only on hate, counterhate, and neutral tweets in
the remainder of this paper.
Anti-Asian Hate and Counterhate Text Classifier
We create a text-based classifier to label tweets as hate,
counterhate, or neutral. We use the annotated dataset to train
text-based machine learning models. We create the follow-
ing three sets of features that are used for classification.
• Linguistic Features [Ling]. This set contains a total of
90 features spanning stylistic, syntactic, and psycholinguis-
tic categories, together representing the linguistic properties
of the text. These features have previously been very effec-
tive in identifying hate speech, cyberbullying, and online de-
ception (Fortuna and Nunes 2018; Salawu, He, and Lums-
den 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand 2017; Kumar et al. 2017).
We incorporate 20 stylistic features, such as the number of
characters and words, fraction of unique words and stop-
words, and the distribution of numeric characters, upper-
case characters, and punctuation in the tweet. In addition,
we use the tweet sentiment (Hutto and Gilbert 2014). Syn-
tactic features include the number of hashtags, URLs, and
mentions in the tweet. Finally, we include the distribution of
the words across the 65 LIWC categories, which accounts
for the psycholinguistic properties of the text (Tausczik and
Pennebaker 2010).
• Hashtags [Hash]. This category counts the number of
occurrences of each hashtag and keyword presented in the
Tweet Dataset section. Even though they are not absolutely
reliable, these features can be strong indicators of the fi-
nal category of the tweet. For example, a tweet containing
‘#RacismIsAVirus’ is more likely to be a counterhate tweet
than a hate tweet.
• Tweet Embeddings [Emb]. The above two feature sets
apply a bag-of-words style approach and ignore seman-
tic meaning. Thus, to incorporate word- and sentence-level
semantics, we embed each tweet using two popular text-
embedding models: GloVe (Pennington, Socher, and Man-
ning 2014) and BERT (Devlin et al. 2018). We used the
GloVe model pre-trained on the 27B token Twitter dataset
to generate 200-dimensional word embeddings, and we took
the average across all content words in the tweet. For BERT,
we first removed all Twitter- and web-specific content such
as URLs, usernames, hashtags, and emojis, and then used
the hidden layer representation of the tweet to generate 768-
dimensional tweet BERT-embeddings.
Model creation and performance. Given the three-class
classification task (hate vs. counterhate vs. neutral), we
trained three separate one-vs-all Logistic Regression clas-
sifiers. Each classifier is trained with all three categories
of features. We conducted five-fold cross-validation on the
hand-annotated dataset. Performance of the models was
measured using precision, recall, F1 scores, and AUROC, as
shown in Table 2. Standard deviations are measured across
the five classification folds.
The performance of other machine learning models, such
as Random Forest classifiers and SVM, was similar to that
of Logistic Regression. We do not train deep learning mod-
els as the training data points are limited and these models
would tend to overfit. In the rest of this section, we discuss
the model performance of the Logistic Regression classifier.
First, we evaluate the performance of a model trained with
GloVe embeddings compared against BERT embeddings, in
terms of the AUROC score. The following table shows the
scores and standard deviations:
Model Hate Counterhate Neutral
BERT 0.864 ± 0.017 0.833 ± 0.019 0.823 ± 0.014
GloVE 0.840 ± 0.010 0.834 ± 0.014 0.784 ± 0.013
The BERT model outperforms the GloVe model in two
out of three tasks, and performs nearly the same in the third
task. Thus, we use BERT embeddings in our further experi-
ments.
The model performances on the three tasks are compared
in Table 2. The table shows the ablation study of the three-
feature set. First, we note that with a single category of fea-
ture, embedding features perform better than linguistic and
hashtag features. This is true for all three one-vs-all classi-
fication tasks. Next, we observe that the addition of hashtag
features to the other two features increases the performance
slightly in all cases. The combination of embeddings and
hashtags performs better among the two in all cases. Finally,
we note that the combination of all features leads to a perfor-
mance that is similar, within error bounds, to the embedding
and hashtag model. We use the simpler of the two models
(as it has less chance of over-fitting) to label the rest of the
tweets in our dataset.
In our entire dataset with 30,963,337 tweets, the models
labeled 891,204 tweets as hateful (2.88%), 200,198 tweets
as counterhate (0.65%), and 26,837,429 tweets as neutral
(86.77%). The remaining tweets triggered more than one
classifier, thus labeling them into more than one category.
These were marked as other and not used in the rest of
the paper. This makes the COVID-HATE dataset the largest
COVID-19-related anti-Asian hate and counterhate dataset
on Twitter.
Characterizing COVID-19 Hate and
Counterhate
In this section, we use the COVID-HATE dataset to analyse
the patterns of hate and counterhate in the Twitter ecosys-
tem. We focus our analysis on the evolution and spread of
hate and counterhate and the characteristics of the users in-
volved.
The Ebb and Flow of Hate and Counterhate
Here we consider the longitudinal and geographical spread
of hate and counterhate tweets in the Twitter ecosystem.
Hate tweets are more frequent than counterhate
tweets. Figure 2 shows the daily distribution of hate and
counterhate tweets. First, we note that hate tweets outnum-
ber counterhate tweets throughout the timeline. Next, the
number of hate and counterhate tweets was negligible-to-
low in January and February. We observe a synchronized
spike in both the timeseries between March 16 and March
19. By the week following the surge, the hate volume per
day settled at a value 134.0% greater than that before the
peak, but counterhate volume returned to a steady state that
was only 15.6% greater than in the week before the peak.
This suggests that hate lingers longer than counterhate.
Nationally-relevant activity sparks countrywide hate.
We dig deeper by further breaking down the hate trend by
geographic regions. We used the OpenStreetMaps API to lo-
cate every tweet (Haklay and Weber 2008). When tweet lo-
cation was unavailable, the user’s profile location was used.
A total of 37.3% of tweets were located and used in this
analysis. Figure 3 shows the trend for the five countries with
the largest number of hate tweets: USA (generated 21.0% of
all hate tweets), India (6.1%), China (4.0%), UK (3.1%) and
Canada (2.1%). Anecdotally, we see that local events lead to
spikes in counts of hate tweets in a country—the spike in the
USA was followed closely by President Trump’s “Chinese
Virus” tweet5 and the spike in India happened after coun-
trywide shelter-in-place orders were enforced. Furthermore,
the rise of COVID-19 cases in a country does not effect
that country’s hatefulness, as measured by the Spearman’s
correlation coeffcient between the number of countrywide
COVID-19 cases and the number of hate tweets in the coun-
try. The values are very low at 1.1× 10−9 and 6.5× 10−13
for the USA and India, respectively.
User Activity and Interactions
Now, we turn to analyzing the properties of users who pro-
duce hate and counterhate tweets. Following the tweet cat-
egorization labels, we divide users, based on their tweets,
into one of the following: hate, counterhate, neutral, or
dual. Hate and counterhate users make at least one tweet
from their respective tweet categories and none in the other.
Users who tweet from both categories are dual. Finally,
users who make at least one COVID-19 tweet, but no hate
or counterhate tweets, are labeled as neutral. Among the
7,841,130 users who tweet about COVID-19, most of the
5https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1239685852093169664
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Figure 2: The number of anti-Asian hate and pro-Asian counter-
hate tweets from January 15–April 17, 2020. Counterhate tweets
are fewer than hate tweets throughout the timeline.
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Figure 3: The number of COVID-19 hate tweets observed in the
five countries generating the most hate tweets. The two major
spikes in USA and India are shortly followed by their respective
nationally-relevant activity.
users (86.97%) are neutral, 394,408 (5.03%) are hateful,
136435 (1.74%) are counterhate users, and the rest are dual.
This distribution mimics the category-wise tweet distribu-
tion. Our analysis uses only the hate, counterhate, and neu-
tral user categories.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of hate
tweets (counterhate tweets, respectively) made by hate users
(counterhate users, resp.). We observe that both distributions
exhibit a long tail, showing that most users make few rele-
vant tweets and only a handful of users are responsible for
spreading hate propaganda and counterhate messages.
Hate users are less engaged in COVID-19 discussions
prior to activation. When a user sends her first hate or coun-
terhate tweet, she is said to be ‘activated.’ Recall that hate
users never make a counterhate tweet and similarly, coun-
terhate users never make a hate tweet. Here we evaluate the
pre-activation hate user and counterhate user behavior. First,
we find that hateful users are slightly less active before acti-
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of hate and counterhate tweets
made by users shows a long tail.
vation, with an average of 6.23 COVID-related tweets, com-
pared with the average of 6.53 COVID-related tweets made
by counterhate users (p < 0.001).6
Next we compare the sentiment and psycholinguistic
properties of hate users and counterhate users, prior to ac-
tivation. On average, hate users write shorter tweets (90.85
vs. 99.31 characters; p < 0.001), while using more URLs
(0.636 vs. 0.546; p < 0.001) and tagging others more often
(0.789 vs. 0.767; p < 0.001). Additionally, their overall sen-
timent scores are also more neutral (0.772 vs. 0.756 score;
p < 0.001).
Altogether, this shows that hate users are less active
and more neutral in the COVID-19 discussion compared to
counterhate users, prior to activation.
After activation, hate users become more active and
hateful than counterhate users. Here we contrast the post-
activation behavior with pre-activation behavior of users. We
find that after activation, hateful users become more active
in the COVID-19 discussion compared to counterhate users
(16.05 vs. 7.66 COVID-related tweets per user; p < 0.001).
Moreover, hateful users make 2.26 hateful tweets on average
compared to only 1.32 counterhate tweets per counterhate
user (p < 0.001).
Overall, our analysis shows that while hateful users do not
participate in COVID-related discussions prior to activation,
they become far more vocal, engaged, and hateful once they
start participating in the discussion.
Social Network Connectivity Structure
In this section, we examine the user-user social connectiv-
ity in the hate ecosystem. As described in the dataset sec-
tion, we crawl the social network containing over 43 million
nodes and 372 million edges. Out of these, 708,166 nodes
have made at least one COVID-19-related tweet. The rest of
the nodes are part of the network as they are neighbors of
these nodes. Figure 1 shows a subgraph of this network.
To understand the differences in how hateful and coun-
terhate users behave, we compare their ego-networks. We
find that on average, hate users are better connected than
counterhate users—hate users follow more users compared
to counterhate users (870.65 vs. 785.41; p < 0.001) and are
followed more (789.17 vs. 697.37; p < 0.001).
Intragroup and intergroup connectivity. Next, we anal-
yse the connectivity of users within and across the differ-
ent groups to establish if nodes express homophily or form
echo chambers. Simply comparing their probability of creat-
ing edges to nodes of a certain group is not sufficient as it is
confounded by the node degrees and node distribution across
categories. Thus, we create a network baseline to model the
expected behavior of nodes and compare the observed be-
havior against this baseline (Leskovec, Huttenlocher, and
Kleinberg 2010).
The baseline networks are created by randomly shuffling
the edges, while keeping the set of nodes the same. The node
degrees are preserved and each node is ensured to have the
6All unpaired t-test values in the paper are computed using
Mann-Whitney U test.
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Figure 5: Hateful and counterhate users are highly interconnected.
They exhibit homophily and are several more times likely to follow
each other.
same number of COVID-19 neighbors as it did in the origi-
nal network, though the neighbors change during shuffling.
We compute the aggregate ego-network statistics across sev-
eral versions of baseline networks (100 in our experiments).
We compare the observed and the baseline behavior us-
ing the probability of connecting to hate, counterhate, and
neutral nodes. Figure 5 presents the results.
Nodes exhibit homophily. First, we examine the propen-
sity for hate and counterhate nodes to connect with nodes
within their own group. In Figure 5(top), we show that coun-
terhate users are 3.1× more likely to connect to other coun-
terhate users compared to the baseline behavior. Similarly,
the bottom figure shows that hateful users connect with other
hateful users 3.7× more than expectation. Thus, nodes are
preferentially connected to other nodes in the same group.
Do hateful and counterhate users form polarized com-
munities? Echo chambers and polarization are commonly-
observed phenomena in social media, which are responsible
for the spread of propaganda and misinformation (Garimella
et al. 2018; Del Vicario et al. 2016; Quattrociocchi, Scala,
and Sunstein 2016). However, it is not known whether echo-
chambers exist in the hate network too. Given that nodes
preferentially connect to similar nodes, four scenarios are
possible. (1) Hate and counterhate users live in isolated
echo-chambers, where these groups do not interact with one
another. (2) On the other extreme, the two groups interact
highly with each other, possibly exhibiting conflict. The re-
maining two possibilities (3) and (4) are that the out-group
connections are one-sided.
Figure 5 illustrates the empirically-observed behavior.
Both hate and counterhate nodes are more likely to connect
with one another than expected. Precisely, hateful users fol-
low counterhate users 2.3×more than expected and counter-
hate users are 2.2× more likely to follow hateful users com-
pared to the baseline. Furthermore, both hateful and counter-
hate users are, on average, 18.2% less likely than expected
to follow neutral users.
Altogether, these indicate that hateful and counterhate
users are highly engaged and closely interact with each
other. Future work includes linguistic analysis of direct
replies between the two groups that will reveal whether their
interactions are pleasant and respectful, or they engage in
altercation and conflicts.
The Role of Bots in Spreading Hate
Here we explore if bots are responsible for spreading and
countering anti-Asian hate and propaganda. We used the
Botometer API (Davis et al. 2016) to assign a bot score to
users. Due to API rate limitations, we restrict our analysis
to 138,706 users sampled randomly from the set of hate and
counterhate users. Following (Shao et al. 2018), we use a
threshold of 0.5 bot score, labeling 8.9% of all users as bots.
Digging deeper, we find that 10.4% hate users are bots and
9.7% of counterhate users are bots. Moreover, hate users are
more likely to be bots—the mean bot score of hate users is
0.195 compared to 0.177 for counterhate users (p < 0.001).
In the following, we contrast the behavior of hateful bots
with hateful non-bot users.
How does bot activity compare to non-bots? As ex-
pected, hateful bots are highly active broadcasters of
COVID-19 (all hate, counterhate, and neutral) content. They
post 1.8× more COVID-19-related content compared to
hateful non-bot users (46.6 vs. 26.5 tweets; p < 0.01). Hate-
ful bots also share 1.2× more hateful content compared to
non-bot users (3.35 vs. 2.79 hateful tweets; p < 0.01).
Do bots connect differently from real users? Surpris-
ingly, hateful bots have fewer followers compared to hateful
real users (667.31 vs 797.87, p < 0.001). Despite this, hate-
ful users are a similar proportion of all followers of hateful
bots and hateful non-bots (8.6% vs 8.4%, p = 0.46). This
shows that hateful bots are able to attract real users to be
followers as effectively as real hateful users.
On the other hand, counterhate bots are not successful in
attracting a relevant audience. They have fewer followers
compared to hateful bots (300.60 vs 667.31, p < 0.001),
and even real counterhate users follow hateful bots 4.32×
more often than counterhate bots. These illustrate that coun-
terhate bots are unable to attract the relevant users who can
potentially amplify counterhate narratives and together re-
duce hate speech on the platform.
Is Hate Contagious?
Antisocial behavior, such as hate speech, abuse, and trolling,
have been shown to exhibit social contagion (Mathew et al.
2019a; Burnap and Williams 2015; Cheng et al. 2017). How-
ever, whether hate speech is spreading as a social contagion
during the COVID-19 pandemic remains to be seen. More-
over, the effect of the simultaneous presence and the spread
of counterhate speech on the spread of anti-Asian hate and
vice-versa is not known. Thus, in this section, we investigate
the within-group and across-group influence on the diffusion
of hate and counterhate speech.
We quantify influence as the likelihood of a user to be-
come hateful (resorting to hate speech for the first time) af-
ter a user is exposed to hate or counterhate tweets from her
neighbors. Similarly, we also explore the effect of neighbor-
hood messages on a node’s likelihood to start sending coun-
terhate tweets for the first time. We refer to a user’s change
of state from the neutral state to hateful or counterhateful
because of neighbors as an infection.
We model the dynamics of hate and counterhate infec-
tion as an event cascade (Goel et al. 2016; Soni, Ramirez,
and Eisenstein 2019). The cascade is a temporally-ordered
sequence of events recording the nodes that transition from
neutral and whether they become hateful or counterhateful.
Each cascade is associated with a function Risks→s′(n)
that quantifies the probability that a user transitions
from neutral to category s′ ∈ {hate, counterhate}
after exposure from n neighbors of category s ∈
{hate, counterhate}. Neighbors are available from the so-
cial network. The infection risk function is calculated as:
Risks→s′(n) =
|Infecteds′ ∩ Exposeds(n)|
|Exposeds(n)| (1)
where Infecteds′ is the set of users already infected with
type s′ and Exposeds(n) is the set of users with at least n
neighbors of type s.
The infection risk function is determined not only by
users’ influence on one another, but also by homophily—the
tendency of similar users to cluster in the network. To tease
out their effect, we create a null model that measures the
baseline risk of infection solely due to homophily. The order
of cascade events is randomly shuffled and the infection risk
is calculated in this random cascade (Anagnostopoulos, Ku-
mar, and Mahdian 2008). The mean baseline infection risk
observed in 100 shuffled cascades is compared to the empir-
ically observed in infection risk. If the empirical infection
risk exceeds the baseline risk, then social contagion is re-
sponsible for the spread of infection (hate or counterhate).
In Figure 6, we compare the empirical infection risk and
the mean baseline risk, along with its 95% confidence inter-
val. We focus on the differences between the two curves.
Figure 6(a) shows that exposure to hate speech increases
the likelihood of adopting hate speech, compared to the
baseline. Moreover, the likelihood of adoption increases as
the number of exposures increase. On the other hand, Fig-
ure 6(b) illustrates that the exposure to hate leads to a mod-
erate increase in the likelihood of counterhate speech infec-
tion, though this increase is within the bounds expected from
homophily.
Next, we look at the impact of exposure to counterhate
speech. In Figure 6(c), we see that the exposure to counter-
hate neighbors results in a reduced likelihood of a node turn-
ing hateful, compared to the baseline. The difference is small
but statistically significant. This suggests that exposure to
counterspeech discourages users from turning malicious. Fi-
nally, Figure 6(d) shows no difference between expected and
observed rate of counterhate leading to more counterhate.
Overall, our analysis in this section shows that hate begets
hate and counterspeech can discourage users from becoming
hateful. Counterhate, on the other hand, does not exhibit net-
work contagion.
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Figure 6: The probability of a node becoming hateful or counter-
hateful after exposure to neighbors tweets, in the observed data and
in the baseline case. (a) Exposure to hate tweets influences users to
be hateful, several times more than expected, while (c) counterhate
tweets reduces nodes from turning hateful. Exposure to neighbor-
hood hate (b) or counterhate (d) does not result in nodes adopting
counterhate more than expected.
Related Work
Here we discuss the works that we have not covered so far.
Hate speech on social media. Detecting hate speech has
been shown to be a challenging task, even for humans, of-
ten resulting in low inter-rater agreement (Ross et al. 2017;
Waseem and Hovy 2016) Automatic hate speech detec-
tion methods are primarily text-based, often based on n-
grams (Xu et al. 2012; Hosseinmardi et al. 2016; Mehdad
and Tetreault 2016; Van Hee et al. 2018), word embed-
dings (Zhao, Zhou, and Mao 2016; Djuric et al. 2015), and
other engineered features from hate dictionaries (ElSherief
et al. 2018a; Liu et al. 2018). More recent methods use deep
neural architectures (Chen, McKeever, and Delany 2019;
Badjatiya et al. 2017), and BERT has shown to outperform
common models without overfitting (Nikolov and Radi-
vchev 2019).
Studies have also focused on the targets of hate (ElSh-
erief et al. 2018b; Silva et al. 2016; Mondal, Silva, and
Benevenuto 2017). Though most online hate speech re-
search has focused on Twitter and Reddit, recent research
has also spanned multiple platforms and fringe communi-
ties (Phadke and Mitra 2020; Mariconti et al. 2018; Mathew
et al. 2019a; Finkelstein et al. 2018; Mittos et al. 2019)
and groups (Vela´squez et al. 2020; Phadke and Mitra 2020;
Phadke et al. 2018). However, none of the above-mentioned
studies are placed in the context of COVID-19, which is the
gap we address.
COVID-19 and social media research. The COVID-19
outbreak has motivated a growing collection of datasets on
social media discourse surrounding COVID-19 (Chen, Ler-
man, and Ferrara 2020; Schild et al. 2020; Vidgen et al.
2020). The discourse also contains a substantial amount of
misinformation (Kouzy et al. 2020; Singh et al. 2020) and
conspiratorial content (Ferrara 2020) that is being shared
and actively spread by social bots (Ferrara 2020; Gallotti et
al. 2020), but these works do not focus on studying hate.
Few studies to date have specifically addressed the spread
of anti-Asian hate on social media. Schild et al. (2020) pro-
posed a multi-platform dataset of hate, but did not address
counterhate speech, which is simultaneously prevalent on
the platform. Our study analyses both hate and counterhate
in a unified framework. Moreover, we create a hand-labeled
dataset and classifier for hate and counterhate detection,
which goes beyond the keyword-style approach adopted in
the paper by Schild et al. (2020). Recently, Chen et al. (2020)
collected tweets containing controversial hashtags like #Chi-
neseVirus. However, as we have shown, the presence of
hashtags is insufficient to label a tweet as hate. We over-
come this shortcoming by developing a hand-labeled dataset
and classifier. Finally, contemporaneous work by Vidgen et
al. (2020) released a large hand-labeled dataset of hate and
counterhate speech. However, they do not conduct any anal-
ysis of the hate ecosystem, which we present in this work,
in addition to a complementary hand-labeled dataset. Due
to the recency of Vidgen et al. (2020), we leave comparison
between the two frameworks for future work.
Counterhate speech. Counterhate speech has qualita-
tively been shown to be the most effective and the least in-
trusive solution to hate speech, though quantitative studies
are limited (Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones 2015; Gagliar-
done et al. 2015; Benesch 2014; Briggs and Feve 2013;
Benesch 2014; Wright et al. 2017; Misˇkolci, Kova´cˇova´, and
Rigova´ 2020; Munger 2017). More recent work has focused
on developing novel counterspeech data sets (Chung et al.
2019; Mathew et al. 2018) and detection classifiers (Mathew
et al. 2019b). Counterhate chatbots have shown initial suc-
cess (Hoekstra et al. 2019). However, none of the previous
works have studied counterhate in the context of COVID-19,
which is the gap that we address in this work.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our findings in this work shed light on an ongoing societal
problem caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Importantly,
by studying online hate speech on Twitter, we have shown
that online hate is more prevalent than counterhate. We show
that hate begets hate, making it crucial to detect hate speech
as early as possible and to reduce its exposure to others. The
current efforts to counter hate speech are limited, exposing
the need to create effective, scalable countermeasures.
Our work has limitations. Our analysis is limited to En-
glish tweets and one platform (Twitter). It will be useful to
extend the analysis to multiple languages and spanning mul-
tiple platforms where COVID-19 discussion happens. Next,
augmenting our dataset with the recently released hand-
labeled dataset of COVID-19-related hateful and counter-
hate tweets can bolster the experiments (Vidgen et al. 2020),
though the findings are not expected to change. Moreover,
our labeling scheme is coarse-grained (hate vs. counterhate
vs. neutral), which limits the ability to study nuanced forms
of hate and counter speech (Salminen et al. 2018). While this
work is limited to anti-Asian hate speech, it will be worth
studying hate and harassment towards other minority groups
during the pandemic.
This work lays the ground work for many important di-
rections of future research. First, while we focused on text-
based hate speech, hate is also spread using images, memes,
and videos. One open research direction is to understand
multimodal hate speech. Next, the interrelation between the
hate ecosystem and the misinformation ecosystem is impor-
tant to study. Finally, curbing the spread of hate speech is
crucial, and more research is needed in developing (semi-
)automated ways to counter hate speech.
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Appendix
Tweet Data Collection Keywords
Below is the list of keywords and hashtags used to collect
tweets.
• covid keywords: corona virus, coronavirus, covid
19, covid-19, covid19.
• hate keywords: #CCPVirus, #ChinaDidThis, #Chi-
naLiedPeopleDied, #ChinaVirus, Chinese virus, #Chinese-
Bioterrorism, #ChineseVirus, chink, chinky, chonky, churka,
cina, cokin, communistvirus, coolie, dink, #FuckChina,
#KungFlu, #MakeChinaPay, niakoue´, pastel de flango, slant,
slant eye, slopehead, ting tong, wuhan virus, wuhanflu,
wuhanvirus, yokel.
• counterhate keywords : #IAmNotAVirus,
#WashTheHate, #RacismIsAVirus, #IAmNotCovid19,
#BeCool2Asians, #StopAAPIHate, #ActToChange,
#HateIsAVirus
